书籍 The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran的封面

The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran

Charles Kurzman

出版时间

2004-04-29

ISBN

9780674013285

评分

★★★★★
书籍介绍

The Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, would remain on the throne for the foreseeable future: This was the firm conclusion of a top-secret CIA analysis issued in October 1978. One hundred days later the shah - despite his massive military, fearsome security police, and superpower support - was overthrown by a popular and largely peaceful revolution. But the CIA was not alone in its myopia, as Charles Kurzman reveals in this penetrating work; Iranians themselves, except for a tiny minority, considered a revolution inconceivable until it actually occurred. Revisiting the circumstances surrounding the fall of the shah, Kurzman offers rare insight into the nature and evolution of the Iranian revolution - and into the ultimate unpredictability of protest movements in general. As one Iranian recalls, "The future was up in the air" - and through interviews and eyewitness accounts, declassified security documents and underground pamphlets, Kurzman documents the overwhelming sense of confusion that gripped pre-revolutionary Iran, and that characterises major protest movements. His book provides a striking picture of the chaotic conditions under which Iranians acted, participating in protest only when they expected others to do so too, the process approaching critical mass in unforeseen and unforeseeable ways. Only when large numbers of Iranians began to "think the unthinkable," in the words of the U.S. ambassador, did revolutionary expectations become a self-fulfilling prophecy. A corrective to 20-20 hindsight, this book reveals shortcomings of analyses that make the Iranian revolution - or any major protest movement - seem inevitable in retrospect.

Charles Kurzman is Professor of Sociology, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

用户评论
库兹曼从政治、动员结构、文化、经济和军事几个方面质疑了结构主义对于伊朗革命为何会成功的解释,提出了一种实际是从运动本身出发的反解释方法:运动之所以成功,是领袖的策略和其他因素使得运动本身具有可生产性(Viability),这让本来不可想象的革命变得thinkable,大众对于革命成功的预期使得更多人参入到革命中并最终推翻了沙阿政权,这很类似于Singh在seizingpower中有关政变成败的观点。其他的,从政治角度的质疑,尤其是针对于回归国家学派对于革命的解释,而当时的伊朗国家可能并没有那么弱;社会动员结构的控制者最初并不是反沙阿的力量;文化的解释可能难以和更多普通人的实用主义相符合;伊朗的经济危机并不周边国家严重;军事观点很难说清沙阿后期的强力镇压。
全书的主要内容是驳论:详细叙述了伊朗革命的过程,每写一段就反驳一种解释革命爆发的理论。然后作者提出自己的理论:革命的过程是充满confusion的,在这种confusion主导的背景下,每个伊朗人都要进行viability的判断,当伊朗人判断其他人将会参与革命时,他们也会参与革命。作者的叙事和理论分析都是优秀的,不过我认为这是一本只写了一半的书:如果民众真的是一直在confusion环境下以对他人行为的判断为基础进行决策,那么为什么有的革命失败了,而伊朗的革命成功了呢?再说,是什么让库姆的霍梅尼支持者在1977年决定开始活动呢?作者似乎没有很好地解释这两点。不过这仍然是一本优秀的作品。
看得很快,前几章驳斥各类解释写得有条理,但kurzman自己给出的viability的解释牵强,类似于说一场革*/命能成功是因为大家觉得它能成功,即使这是很显然,或者也不那么显然的主客观认识上的龃龉;