书籍 Legality的封面

Legality

Scott J. Shapiro

出版时间

2011-01-03

ISBN

9780674055667

评分

★★★★★
书籍介绍

What is law? This question has preoccupied philosophers from Plato to Thomas Hobbes to H. L. A. Hart. Yet many others find it perplexing. How could we possibly know how to answer such an abstract question? And what would be the point of doing so? In Legality, Scott Shapiro argues that the question is not only meaningful but vitally important. In fact, many of the most pressing puzzles that lawyers confront - including who has legal authority over us and how we should interpret constitutions, statutes, and cases - will remain elusive until this grand philosophical question is resolved. Shapiro draws on recent work in the philosophy of action to develop an original and compelling answer to this age-old question. Breaking with a long tradition in jurisprudence, he argues that the law cannot be understood simply in terms of rules. Legal systems are best understood as highly complex and sophisticated tools for creating and applying plans. Shifting the focus of jurisprudence in this way - from rules to plans - not only resolves many of the most vexing puzzles about the nature of law but has profound implications for legal practice as well. Written in clear, jargon-free language, and presupposing no legal or philosophical background, "Legality" is both a groundbreaking new theory of law and an excellent introduction to and defense of classical jurisprudence.

斯科特·夏皮罗(Scott. J. Shapiro),耶鲁大学法学院Charles F. Southmayd法律教授和哲学教授。研究领域包括法理学、国际法、宪法理论、行动理论和权威理论,被视为法律实证主义阵营继哈特、拉兹之后的第三代领军人物之一。

用户评论
这学期借机完成了这本书和部分相关文献的阅读,同时也参考了10/19/2021台湾法理学会陈弘儒老师的导读和本书配套的播客。4/11/2022 Shapiro本人还专门过来搞了个座谈进一步澄清,会后也有机会请教了他几个问题。全书大致分五个部分:阐述法理学的方法论;重构法实证主义的论证;提出自己的规划理论;回应德沃金等对法实证主义的批判;规划理论的一些应用。重点关注了前三部分。第一部分争议很大,Leiter最近两篇文章痛批形而上学进路的误区;第二部分批判更多,Gardner&Macklem认为其对哈特practice theory of rules严重误读(Leiter甚至认为就压根不存在PT);第三部分争议不少,关于plan及planning theory有很多在诠释和理解等方面的差别(续)
规划理论对标德沃金对分离命题的批判以及对于理论争议的处置。惜乎貌似契约论翻版,且对柔性实证主义与德翁“循环论证”的批判禁不住推敲。陈述哈特德沃金之争颇见功力,对分离命题的辩护贡献大而对法律解释的分析无法自洽。
发现自己完全忽略了Shapiro对Dworkin理论的诠释,当他把Dworkin的理论解释成一种元解释学,即对法律解释方法的研究时,他就进入了对法律适用而非法律性质问题的研究。这样看来,Shapiro后一部分的论证可以说完全是对Dworkin理论的回应,即探求我们应该采取什么办法确定一个法律命题的真值。Shapiro在Dworkin理论的基础上发展出了一种对法律的元解释学(类似德国的法学方法论),反思并整合了现有的各种零散法律解释方法,可以说这一部分才是本书的精化。不过我仍然对Shapiro诉诸历史材料的后验论证存在疑问,因为这样的论证不但受限于经验材料而具有不确定性,还只能形成一种地方性理论,而或许有某种先验路径可以解决上帝之眼和规划这两种元解释理论之间的矛盾。
道德目标命题已经越来越边缘了 迫使讨论不得不向上走。